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How should we best imagine the relationship of anthropology and media studies?  
Will this be a fruitful union? Arguably anthropology and media studies are at their best 
when they are critical, in the double sense not only of interrogating and seeking to 
understand the conditions of possibility of their subjects’ thinking, but also of their own 
criteria and practices of inquiry. So I will consider how critical reflection on revered 
anthropological tenets has surprising implications for the presuppositions of media 
studies.  I will start with a critical analysis of an anthropological venture into media 
studies then show how it invites a radical (i.e. critical presuppositional) rethinking of a 
‘hegemonic text’ of media studies, Stuart Hall’s Encoding/Decoding. 
 
Ships passing in the night? 
 
 Speaking as an anthropologist, a brief critical reading suggests there is a curious 
sense of something lacking in media studies itself, which has inspired hope among 
some critical media scholars of finding the missing bits in anthropology.  For example, 
discontent with the inadequacies of the quantitative and macro studies of media has led 
to interest in qualitative, or ethnographic, approaches.  David Morley, noting the 
problems inherent in ethnographic description (1992: 186-197), and Ien Ang, 
commenting on its potentially infinite contextualism (1996: 66-81), both deferred to the 
work of the totemic figure of Clifford Geertz.   
 
Significantly media scholars invoke anthropology at precisely the point where 
scientific approaches to society prove manifestly inadequate.  The appeal to intensive 
participatory ethnography complicates naturalism and scientism beautifully, because it 
highlights the dialogic relationship between the ethnographer’s and the subjects’ 
practices of knowing, explaining, justifying etc.  Johannes Fabian has argued that 
ethnography is best thought of as a performance interpolated into the other 
performances that constitute social life (1990).  However recourse to practice 
dismantles totalizing accounts of cultures, which, despite their protestations to the 
contrary, leaves most anthropologists and cultural studies’ specialists without an object 
of study. 
 
Choosing Geertz as the representative anthropologist is not fortuitous, as he is 
widely imagined as a proponent of strong culturalism, an antidote to naturalist or 
economistic reductivism.  Close study of Geertz’s work shows his culturalism to be 
supplementary.  Culture is strapped onto ‘hard...political, economic, stratificatory 
realities’ and ‘biological and physical necessities’ (1973: 30).  Culture is the gunk that 
plugs the holes in existing theories, the while proclaiming itself new and different.  
Geertz’s model of culture is in fact a conventional account of articulation that allows 
interpretive freedom without challenging the ontological status of the elements it 
articulates.  But this account of culture has a long pedigree in German Idealism (Hobart 
2000), which leaves media studies awkwardly embracing a murky transcendentalism. 
 
 Anthropology’s obvious critical contribution to media studies is recognizing the 
problems of ethnocentrism, which pervades cultural, communication and media studies.  
Anthropologists’ denunciations of others’ ethnocentrism however verge on the 
disingenuous; as it is questionable how satisfactorily anthropologists have addressed 
the issue.   
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On a stronger reading of culture however, the anthropologists’ task is not just to 
inquire into different ways of thought and action.  It is to understand the 
presuppositions that motivate such thinking and acting, and so to appreciate how other 
people explain, represent and mediate events and actions.  Anthropologists here are 
poised between non-commensurate discourses, the disjunctures between which gives 
rise to many of our critical dilemmas.1  Taken seriously, this deprives anthropologists 
of a critical turn of mind of the possibility of closure, of epistemological grounding or 
certainty (Fabian 1991).  The anthropologist as unitary knowing subject emerges as an 
impossible fiction, as we are obliged to participate in an open unfinalizable dialogue.  
Such a radical account of critical understanding invites anthropology and media studies 
to interrogate one another in a dialogic engagement which problematizes the discursive 
unity of inquiry, the subjects and objects of study and the nature of representation and 
mediation. 
 
 
Anthropology meets the modern world 
 
 Quite apart from their long-standing interest in visual anthropology and 
ethnographic film, anthropologists, who often resemble the predatory acephalous 
lineages they study, have engaged in their favourite pastime of ragbag colonizing or 
liberating of other disciplines through direct nounal assault – frequently by declaring a 
new sub-field, ‘the anthropology of…x’, ‘x’ in this instance being media (e.g. Askew & 
Wilk 2002; Ginsburg et. al. 2002).  While many such works have the modest and useful 
aim of ethnographic inquiry, others are more intellectually expansionist and determined 
to claim the contemporary relevance of anthropology in new fields.  One such piece 
appeared recently in Anthropology today, a magazine aimed at popularizing 
anthropology.  I wish to consider it carefully for several reasons.  Its author is a 
seasoned anthropologist, writing in a publication of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute, which represents the august and authoritative voice of British anthropology. 2  
Finally, in its enthusiasm to show just what anthropology can do for – and to – cultural 
and media studies, revealingly it displays its intellectual underwear. 
 
 In Born a Lady, became a Princess, died a Saint, Bill Watson, asked pertinently 
what exactly was going on in the aftermath of the death of Princess Diana.  Goaded by 
the absence of anthropological enunciation on these events, his aim was to demonstrate 
anthropology’s contemporary relevance to the study of mass media and popular culture.  
To do so he had to come up with a distinctive explanation.  It turned upon two trusty –
indeed rusty – anthropological standbys: the essentially sacred nature of royalty, and 
the significance of sacrifice.  Both are captured in a single truth: ‘Diana is for British 
society the royal sacrificial victim’ (1997: 6).  Quite apart from the rather quaint notion 
that there is such a unitary thing as British society to which anthropologists 
mysteriously have privileged access, the whole gamut of events surrounding Princess 
Diana’s death, and apparently their refraction in distant parts of the globe, can be 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Ron Inden and Richard Fox, who gave invaluable comments on the first and final drafts 
of this chapter respectively. 
2 I trust Bill Watson, who is an old colleague and a cherished sparring-partner, will forgive my use of his 
work as a good example of contemporary British anthropological thinking. 
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reduced to the formula ‘royal = sacred = died for our [the nation’s] sins’ (1997: 6; 
unless indicated otherwise all italics and parentheses are in the original).  It was this 
cultural formula that articulated the ‘collective emotion’ (1997: 4).  As with most grand 
anthropological pronouncements, it enshrines a certain magnificent universality and 
timelessness, of which history tends to make a mockery.  Subsequent media coverage 
of Diana’s death raised questions not only about the grimy politics of Diana’s 
apotheosis, but why all the dissenting voices felt they had to keep quiet. 
 
 What concerns me is not so much Watson’s explanation of events after Diana’s 
death as what his argument presupposes. Like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock 
Holmes’ story, the piece is significant for what it does not say – especially about the 
importance of the media in anthropological analyses.   
 
 
The death of an argument 
 
 Watson’s article is important because, almost in the strict Derridean sense, it 
deconstructs itself to reveal familiar presuppositions about agency, media, ontology and 
the nature of anthropological argument itself. 
 
Royalty, it transpired, was not just sacred in 1990s Britain, but its sacredness rises 
above history, place and culture.  Commenting on Diana’s brother’s remarks at her 
funeral, Watson argued: 
anthropologists can surely not fail to see here an instance of the much documented 
phenomenon of a challenge being made to the legitimacy and sacred status of the 
monarch by a principle which would, formulaically at least, carry equal weight to the 
principle of divine kingship, namely the claim that vox populi, vox dei.  This republican 
cry in terms of British history may be of relatively recent date, but it reflects an 
institution well documented in anthropological and historical scholarship.  When the 
Chinese emperor loses the mandate of heaven or when the Shilluk king loses his 
strength, then the people and the people’s spokesman must intervene for the sake of the 
nation to ensure a proper succession (1997: 6). 
While the image of Shilluk kings and Chinese emperors rubbing shoulders with the 
Windsors and their affines is charmingly ecumenical, invoking scholarly authority to 
impose contemporary, contested and arguably vacuous European categories (the nation, 
the people, republicanism) on the whole history and diversity of the world is 
problematic: as if power and social divisions everywhere lined up conveniently.   
 
Anthropologists dwell much upon authority.  However, to accept uncritically that 
royalty everywhere is always sacred rather begs the question: we know how to identify 
sacredness and royalty unambiguously, uncontrovertibly and universally by applying 
the categories that were handed down to us!  In place of critical dialogue, Watson has 
imposed a stultifying monologue in the name of anthropological authority. 
 
 
 Of Princess Diana’s death, Watson states  
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there can be little doubt that what we witnessed at the time, pace the cynical 
interpretations of Common Room philosophers, was the articulation of collective 
emotion (1997: 4).   
Leaving aside how you would determine that the same emotion was shared by millions 
of people, Watson used ‘articulation’ as a synonym for ‘expression’, as if there were 
some abstract collective mind that seeks instantiation in the world.  Surprisingly he 
ignored, or was ignorant of, an alternative to this dualistic ontology.  In cultural studies 
‘articulation’ has come to have the double sense of ‘to utter’ and ‘to link’.  So 
structures, far from being unitary, non-contradictory, stable, transcendent entities as in 
Watson’s fixed conjunctions, are treated as moments of arbitrary closure, the partial, 
incomplete products of acts of articulatory practices.  According to Hall, articulation 
emerges as 
the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain 
conditions.  It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for 
all time.  You have to ask under what circumstances can a connection be forged or 
made?  The so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct 
elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary 
‘belongingness’ ([1986] 1996a: 141). 
There are at least two readings.  Structure is not necessarily engraved in stone, but is 
open to a degree of rearticulation, under circumstances that remain, however, 
unspecified.  On a strong reading however, articulation replaces structure with an 
account of action as situated, underdetermined and so partly contingent.  And subjects 
are those moments of lack of structural determination (Laclau 1990a).  The difference 
is significant. 
 
 The problem of analyses like Born a Lady is that what is articulated to what is 
blissfully unclear, as is how collectivities are constituted, according to whom and under 
what circumstances?  (Now, done well, such carefully situated analyses are precisely 
what anthropology can bring to media studies.)  The appeal of such arguments lies 
partly in the way they sweep a whole pile of awkward questions under the carpet, so 
saving our sense of mastery over explanation, if not over events, from seeming in 
tatters.  What counts as evidence and what constitutes an explanation, when you have 
the actions, contradictory utterances and commentaries of many different people and 
groups with different interests?  There is the classical hermeneutic question of how to 
avoid the ‘self-confirmability’, and assess the relative validity, of different 
interpretations.  Then there are the far less considered issues of how you arrive at – let 
alone rethink, if need be – the criteria for assessing validity itself in the first place. 
 
 
Ultimate interpretations 
 
 What sort of activity are contemporary commentators like Watson engaged in 
when they interpret?  At one stage he appears to be establishing global resemblances, 
but later he appears to try to divine a deeper meaning, some previously hidden truth 
beneath appearances.  The first begs questions of how you establish the resemblances 
to begin with.  In the second, interpretation involves revealing the depth that emerges – 
like the revelation that royalty is sacred and Diana a sacrifice – ‘as an absolutely 
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superficial secret’ (Foucault 1990: 62).  If, however, the modern world is distinguished 
by the endlessness of interpretation,  
it is simply because there is nothing to interpret.  There is nothing absolutely primary to 
interpret, because at bottom everything is already interpretation’ (1990: 64).   
Watson regarded superficiality and the failure to ground representations in an absolute 
truth as properties of the media (1997: 5).  However, not only are media representations 
inextricable from the conditions of contemporary interpretation, but there is no unitary 
essence ‘the media’, as media practitioners endlessly complain of media studies’ 
generalizations. 
 
 Behind this interpretive morass is a problem of representation.  To represent (in 
whatever sense) something or someone presupposes that they are in some way absent.  
The possibility of ‘absolute representation, the total transparency between the 
representative and the represented, means the extinction of the relationship of 
representation’ (Laclau 1990a: 38).  Effective representation therefore depends upon 
the imperfection of the relationship in practice.  Put another way, as Nelson Goodman 
pointed out, you can never represent something as itself (1968).  You can only 
represent it as something else.  Representing is an act that transforms what it addresses, 
while appearing to underwrite its originality and authenticity.  Summing up the life and 
death in 1997 of Princess Diana as ‘ritual, collective behaviour, the force of symbols, 
death and mortuary rituals’ (Watson 1997: 3) conjures up a reverse Philosopher’s 
Stone.  The complexities of contemporary lifestyles are transmuted with a nostalgic 
flourish into tribalized trivia. 
 
 
The unmediated truth 
 
 This brings us to a crucial point in Watson’s article, which raises important issues 
for media studies more generally.  Diana’s death had to be different from other famous 
media-celebrated deaths, whether Marilyn Monroe’s or James Dean’s.  The answer was 
neat. 
The celebrity of pop-idols is artificial.  Like Presidents they are man-made, created by 
their fans.  They are in this respect false idols, creations of cults and sects, powerful 
images, but in the last resort unsupported by any transcendental ideology or theology 
and hence unreal and inauthentic.  Diana however belongs to a very different category: 
she is very much real and authentic precisely because she is perceived as not being 
created by the media or the public (1997: 5, my italics). 
I assure you, I did not make this up.  Let me single out two themes: 1) media celebrity 
is artificial, ‘man-made’ and so ‘inauthentic’; 2) reality and authenticity is a function of 
some transcendental template. 
 
 Watson touched with unerring aim on two widespread presuppositions about the 
media.  They involve artifice, dissemblance, lack of groundable truth – features, as I 
noted, of interpretation itself.  They are the noise, distortion and pollution that obscure, 
suppress or poison authentic communication.  The media are, in short, profane: the 
locus, medium or even the source of profanity.  Only what is not made, what is not 
touched by this profanity, but is set apart (sacred) under transcendental guarantee is real 
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and authentic.  In order to rescue what is of lasting value from the transient, the 
essential from the accidental, reality from appearance, the ‘influence’ of the media must 
be exorcized.   
 
The profane world is not simply dirt, turpitude and sin, or even everyday life in all 
its ordinariness and banality.  It is a competitive, rootless, alienated world.  On the one 
hand stands unity, in the form of community, communion and genuine human 
communication, on the other a world as imagined by Hobbes and Durkheim in harness.  
Less obviously, but more importantly, the profane is imagined as a world of difference 
and diversity as against a world where difference is finally transcended and unity 
prevails.   
 
At this point the reason for the pervasive use of dichotomy in such accounts 
becomes apparent.  It is necessary to sustain the incoherences of the constitutive 
idealism.  Try imagining a world without difference.  It would, on almost any account, 
be a world without language, signification or culture.  At best, sacred beings would be 
reduced to indifferent mumblings – a point nicely appreciated by mediums in many 
parts of the world.  What bearing though does this divagation have on media studies?  
Quite simply, historically the idea of communication in European thinking has been 
linked to ideas of community and communion – in other words, as Victor Turner 
pointed out (1969), of communitas, of an ideal and unsustainable sharing and unity – 
not a good theoretical basis for a theory of everyday human interaction.  In the world of 
the ‘pure’, unmediated object, would you have to avoid books, newspapers, television, 
Internet, speech?  Indeed you would not learn of the death of Princess Diana at all.  
This is less longing for a cloistered world au recherche du temps perdu, than for a 
world that never existed. 
 
Getting down to business 
 
Anthropology, rubicund with age, might be excused its excesses.  So can we turn to 
lean, mean media studies born in the cauldron of post-Gramscian Marxist sociology 
and political economy for a thoroughly modern analysis of the issues?  Central to the 
emergence of media studies as a discipline are several works by Stuart Hall, including 
notably Encoding/Decoding (1980) and The rediscovery of ideology (1982), in which 
Hall distinguished and distanced critical media studies from ‘mainstream’ American 
mass communication’s research.  Arguing against these behavioural models and 
drawing upon television as the example, Hall tried to temper communication as the 
transmission of referential messages by framing it through 
a structure produced and sustained through the articulation of linked but distinctive 
moments – production, circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction…a ‘complex 
structure in dominance’ sustained through the articulation of connected practices…  The 
‘object’ of these practices is meanings and messages in the form of sign-vehicles of a 
specific kind organized, like any form of communication through the operation of codes 
within the syntagmatic chain of a discourse (1980: 128) 
The presupposition that communication rests upon transmission of messages containing 
meaning remains intact.  The social circumstances of its working are simply added.  
Two interesting words make their appearance, ‘discourse’ and ‘practice’, which suggest 
a possible serious revision of otherwise conventional concepts.  Discourse, however, is 
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used in a weak linguistic sense, not a stronger sociologically constitutive manner, 
which is surprising in a work that sets out to socialize communication.  The role of 
practice in this account will emerge shortly. 
 
How does meaning, and so ideology, get into the messages and get extracted? 
The discursive form of the message has a privileged position in the communicative 
exchange…[and] the moments of ‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’, through ‘relatively 
autonomous’ in relation to the communicative process as a whole, are determinate 
moments (1980: 129, my parentheses). 
The model not only links structure to practice and explains how discursive closure 
works on the messages, but it can also account for degrees of understanding or 
misunderstanding, which 
depend on the degrees of identity/non-identity between the codes which perfectly or 
imperfectly transmit, interrupt or systematically distort what has been transmitted… 
What are called ‘distortions’ or ‘misunderstandings’ arise precisely from the lack of 
equivalence between the two sides of the communicative exchange (1980: 131). 
This lack of equivalence enables different subject positions from which viewers may 
notionally decode programmes.  That is, they may accept the meaning that the 
producers desire (the dominant-hegemonic position), adapt such meanings according to 
one’s own position (using a negotiated code) or engage in systematic critical reading 
(using an oppositional code, 1980: 136-38). 
 
 The importance of Hall’s work has been justly recognized as offering a critical 
alternative to positivistic and normative sociology.  But is Hall’s argument quite as 
radical as is often assumed?  And what are its theoretical assumptions? 
 
While Encoding/Decoding highlights how communication is structured, what is the 
status of transmission models and their messages?  They still provide the transcendental 
guarantee of communicability, but with new, added imperfection.  Including structure 
compensates for the shortcomings of the old models in several ways.3  Noise – the 
dreaded distortion that plagues dreams of near perfect communication – now ceases to 
be a technical problem and is attributable to society, class or capital working 
themselves out through media practices.  Practice, it turns out, has the task of 
specifying how structure instantiates itself in process. 
 
The entire apparatus of basic transmission models remains in place however.  Codes 
still transmit messages ‘perfectly or imperfectly’.  Communication still works through 
‘symbolic vehicles constituted within the rules of “language”’ (1980: 128).  Rather 
more interestingly, Hall clings onto ‘the conduit metaphor of language’ (Reddy 1979), 
according to which speech and images are containers of meanings, an account that 
presupposes the classical idealist dichotomy between message (form, appearance) and 
meaning (essence).  Strapped onto bog standard seventies’ semiology, we have 
schoolboy ‘commonsense’ semantics, the ‘good sense’ behind which dropped off some 
                                                 
3 The ‘object’ remains meanings and messages (see above).  ‘A “raw” historical event cannot, in that 
form, be transmitted by, say, a television newscast.  Events can only be signified within the aural-visual 
forms of the televisual discourse (Hall 1980: 129). 
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time after Classical Greece.  Hall has carefully to tiptoe around the critical thinking 
coming out of France at the time.  And his account of practice is simply how structure 
manages to affect action.  At no point does he consider the radical alternative sense of 
pragmatic, namely that humans engage in all sorts of practices of asserting, denying, 
questioning, deceiving and so forth where communication and understanding are at 
once partial and underdetermined judgements on moments in the histories of such 
practices, and contestable claims within such histories.   
 
In order to distinguish a critical media from a communications studies’ approach, 
Hall needs to frame the referential function of televisual language and images, which 
foregrounds issues of accuracy and bias in representation.  In order to show deep 
structure at work through underlying ideological closure, Hall seizes upon another 
dichotomy: 
it is at the connotative level of the sign that situational ideologies alter and transform 
signification…The level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual reference and 
positioning in different discursive fields of meaning and association, is the point where 
already coded signs intersect with the deep semantic codes of a culture (1980: 133). 
Oddly, Hall insists on trying to analyze complex discursive practices using the notion 
of signs.  It is like trying to build a space rocket out of matchsticks.  As Ricoeur noted, 
signs are so primitive as to be unable even to deal with the relation of predication on 
which sentences are based, let alone more complex utterances like texts.  Both these, 
being of different, logically more complex, orders, require quite different kinds of 
analysis (1976).4  Textuality, famously, introduces context, through the hermeneutic 
circle (Ricoeur 1981).  And we have not yet even broached the question of 
intertextuality, of the pre-understandings and learned practices of reading and 
interpretation required to understand a text in the first place.  Or why the literary notion 
of ‘text’ should be applied to the social analysis of television programmes?  We start to 
see why Hall fights shy of theory.  It would make life distinctly more complicated.  
Perhaps he was wise to stick to signs with easily decipherable meanings that enable 
him to emasculate context and keep the show on the road. 
 
A notion crucial to Hall’s argument, as his title suggests, is ‘code’.  It has to fulfil 
several tasks at once.  It must mobilize structure and bring it to bear on media 
production and reception, while ‘concealing the practices of coding that are present’ 
(1980: 132).  It must recreate reality, now naturalized, so that ideology is made 
invisible, and so easily insertable into messages, which are therefore easily 
swallowable.  To do so, it must simplify the vast diversity of human textuality and 
visuality into apprehensible and easily analyzable form.  It must encompass a 
bewildering range of possible contexts of reference and situations of use.  What is more 
it must have a classical hermeneutic structure, in other words a surface appearance, 
which deceives ordinary mortals, must yield at the hands of the initiated expert to 
reveal hidden depths which motivate the whole.  Fortunately initiates – in the guise of 
media studies’ specialists – are at hand, summoned into life by Encoding/Decoding. 
                                                 
4 Matters are more complicated still, both because of the issues surrounding how you analyze images and 
the relationship between images and text.  Using connotation and denotation to address relations of 
predication, textuality and imagery is slightly like using a tin opener and strawberry jam as tools to 
engineer the space rocket. 
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So what is the remarkable intellectual apparatus through which this is all achieved?  
It turns out to be none other than a highly conventional and rigid notion worked out by 
structuralist semiologists for signs, which has precious little to do with textual or 
discursive analyses that you might have expected for such complex textual and 
discursive processes.  At this point Hall’s interesting attempt to introduce practice into 
the study of media collides with, and is defeated by, his structuralist inclinations.  
Bakhtin, developing Volosinov’s trenchant critique of structural theories of speech and 
language, located a significant part of the problem in how the inevitably open, 
contestable and partly contingent nature of context is reified and fixed. 
Context and code.  A context is potentially unfinalized; a code must be finalized.  A code 
is only a technical means of transmitting information; it does not have cognitive, creative 
significance.  A code is a deliberately established, killed context (Bakhtin 1986: 147). 
A code is not a fact of nature, culture or language, but an act of power by an analyst.  
Earlier, in claiming to know the meaning of Diana’s death, Watson was less 
deciphering a code, than reifying and overinterpreting a situationally labile context in 
the name of reality.   
 
The issue is not trivial.  In eliminating the gamut of possible contexts and situations 
of use, Hall adopts a distinctive epistemological position of imagining society as 
a founding totality which presents itself as an intelligible object of ‘knowledge’ 
[cognitio] conceived as a process or re-cognition… Against this essentialist vision we 
tend nowadays to accept the infinitude of the social, that is, the fact that any structural 
system is limited, that is it always surrounded by an excess of meaning which it is unable 
to master (Laclau [1983] 1990b: 90). 
Hall reiterates the essentialist proposition that the object of knowledge is not just 
conveniently finite, but that it is in principle fully accessible to the expert knowing 
subject.  So, far from being radical, Hall has to fly in the face of his own main 
intellectual sources, which argue that the knower does not transcend the known, in 
order to reassert the epistemological hierarchy of the knower over the known.  He also 
quietly presupposes the idea of a founding totality – the return of the repressed sacred, 
which the initiated mind can recognize behind appearances and circumstances. 
 
Hall needs codes to get to his central object of study – ideology.  The kind of codes 
he is interested in 
clearly contract relations for the sign with the wider universe of ideologies in a society.  
These codes are means by which power and ideology are made to signify in particular 
discourses…  They are, if you like, the fragments of ideology (1980: 134). 
Ideology is the means through which Hall claims to be able to determine which are the 
‘preferred readings’ of the ‘dominant cultural order’ (1980: 134) and to identify the 
pollutant afflicting the masses that intellectuals have to scrub off.  Writing specifically 
about this use of ideology in Marxist writings, Laclau notes that such 
order – or structure – no longer takes the form of an underlying essence of the social; 
rather it is an attempt – by definition unstable and precarious – to act over that ‘social’, to 
hegemonize it (1990b: 91). 
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In contrast to Hall’s massive structures of power and meaning encoded in dominant-
hegemonic positions, the social always threatens to elude such structuration – to 
‘seduce’ it, in Baudrillard’s terms (1990).  It is slightly tricky for someone who 
positioned himself (or has been positioned) as the key theoretical figure in two related 
disciplines, cultural and media studies, to turn a blind eye to what does not suit him as 
‘excesses of theory’.  It would seem to require something close to hubris airily to 
dismiss the sustained and carefully argued critique of your position by the philosopher 
whose ideas you admit were constitutive of those disciplines (e.g. 1996a: 142-46). 
 
Hall’s account of the working of ideology in the media presupposes false 
consciousness.  Viewers are imagined as liable to lapse into false consciousness or 
wallow benightedly in it as their default state.  Nor are producers immune, as there are 
‘professional codes’ to keep them ‘within the hegemony of the dominant code’, 1980: 
136).  Laclau’s second argument against such accounts of ideology is that 
the notion of false consciousness only makes sense if the identity of the social agent can 
be fixed.  It is only on the basis of recognizing its true identity that we can assert that the 
consciousness of the subject is ‘false’ (1990b: 91). 
Hall’s argument leaves him in the arrogant – and untenable – position of being able to 
determine accurately the status of everyone else’s consciousness because, standing 
outside and above the slough of codes, ideology and the entire apparatus of the profane, 
he can judge clearly and dispassionately. 
 
The alternative to such epistemological omniscience is to address the difficult 
implications of acknowledging that 
the identity and homogeneity of social agents was an illusion, that any social subject is 
essentially decentred, that his/her identity is nothing but the articulation of constantly 
changing positionalities.   But, if any social agent is a decentred subject…in what sense 
can we say that subjects misrecognize themselves?  The theoretical ground that made 
sense of the concept of ‘false consciousness’ has evidently dissolved (Laclau 1990b: 92). 
Nor is Hall in a position to dismiss this as so much highfalutin post-structuralist theory 
(see Chen 1996) of little relevance to the stern realities of contemporary politics, 
because he himself recognized the impossibility of treating subjects as unitary and 
centred (1996b). 
 
Finally, ideology is a double-edged sword.  For, it follows that 
the ideological would be the will to ‘totality’ of any totalizing discourse.  And insofar as 
the social is impossible without some fixation of meaning, without the discourse of 
closure, the ideological must be seen as constitutive of the social.  The social only exists 
as the vain attempt to institute that impossible object: society.  Utopia is the essence of 
any communication and social practice (Laclau 1990b: 92).   
Laclau unerringly puts his finger on the transcendentalism latent in both the concepts of 
communication and Marxist accounts of social practice.  More prosaically, Hall’s 
revelation of ideology and hegemony at work in the media itself turns out to be 
ideological and hegemonic!  His analysis of the mass media also involves a totalizing 
discourse, which, thanks to Watson, we can now appreciate as presupposing a 
transcendental sacred space occupied by the superior knowing subject of the university 
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academic.  Viewed from anthropology, Hall’s argument emerges as a sustained fugue 
about the profanity of the media, enshrined in the contrapunct of ideology.  Even so 
spankingly modern a discipline as media studies, for all ‘its sometimes dazzling 
internal theoretical development’ (Hall 1996c: 272) has not managed to exorcize the 
profane, it just changed its name. 
 
 
Future engagement? 
 
So what is the theoretical ground of cultural studies on Hall’s account?  It turns out 
to be a thing of sheds and patches.  But what is the price of this theoretical incoherence 
– indeed incontinence?  Hall’s disdain for the excesses of theory is well known, if 
slightly surprising for someone widely considered the theoretical godfather of cultural 
and media studies.  But what are the implications of this disdain? Hall is hoist on his 
own ideological petard: he turns out to be as much part of the problem as the solution.  
Hall may lay claim to political radicality; on the analysis of Encoding/Decoding any 
claim to intellectual radicality is vacuous.  Especially considering the theoretically 
revolutionary times he was writing in, Hall occupies not just a conservative, but even a 
fairly reactionary, epistemological position.  It requires an act of will not to wonder 
whether it is precisely these drawbacks that have him such a luminary in the Anglo-
Saxon intellectual world. 
 
My point is not that there is something peculiarly wrong with either anthropology 
or media studies.  By standards, they are rather more coherent than most academic 
disciplines. My aim is to show that a critical analysis of scholarly presuppositions can 
yield surprising results that fly in the face of, and undermine, disciplinary orthodoxies.  
What excites me is the possible unpredictability in the outcome of any engagement of 
media studies and anthropology.  In the meantime, the lesson for ambitious young 
scholars to draw would seem to be: theoretical incoherence and incontinence pay.  Just 
please do not bother to project any resulting profanity onto the media. 
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